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INTRODUCTION 
The Opelousas police arrested Brian Armstrong on the evening of 
September 27, 2009, for “disturbing the peace due to intoxication” after 
he disrupted an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting.1 By sunrise, he was 
dead.2 No policeman stopped by Mr. Armstrong’s cell, which held three 
other inmates, between midnight and six o’clock.3 During the time when 
the police left the cell unattended, two of the inmates attacked and killed 
Mr. Armstrong, while the other inmate yelled for a policeman to help.4 No 
help arrived.5 
Mr. Armstrong’s mother, Ms. Joyce Gorman, sued the city of 
Opelousas and the Opelousas Police Department6 for their role in her son’s 
death.7 In December 2010, Ms. Gorman asked the City to identify its 
liability insurer.8 After failing to comply with discovery requests for seven 
months, the City finally named Lexington Insurance Company as its 
liability insurer.9 
In September 2011, Ms. Gorman joined Lexington as a defendant in 
her lawsuit against the City.10 Lexington moved for summary judgment, 
contending that the claims Ms. Gorman asserted were not covered under 
the City’s claims-made-and-reported policy, because the City had not 
provided Lexington with written notice of her claim until after the policy 
had expired.11 The trial court granted Lexington’s motion for summary 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2015, by GRANT TOLBIRD. 
 1. State v. King, 124 So. 3d 623, 625 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2013). 
 2. Id. at 626. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Both defendants are referred to as “the City” throughout this Note.  
 7. Gorman v. City of Opelousas, 148 So. 3d 888, 890 (La. 2014). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 890–91 (The policy stated as follows: “The wrongful act [for which 
the City is liable] shall take place on or after the retroactive date, but before the 
end of the policy period, and shall arise solely in your capacity as a law 
enforcement agency. A claim for a wrongful act shall be first made against the 
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judgment.12 The court of appeal reversed, holding that “the contractual 
notice provision cannot be used to deprive Gorman of her vested rights 
under the direct action statute [sic].”13 
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in a four-to-three opinion, reversed the 
court of appeal and reinstated the trial court’s grant of Lexington’s motion 
for summary judgment.14 Like the circuit split that existed prior to 
Gorman,15 the majority opinion and the dissent wildly diverged on basic 
application of the Direct Action Statute,16 which permits an injured 
plaintiff to sue the tortfeasor’s insurer directly.17 Ultimately, the Court 
deprived Ms. Gorman of her ability to recover against Lexington, because 
the City refused to provide Lexington with notice of Ms. Gorman’s 
claim.18 Ms. Gorman was thus forced to settle her lawsuit against the 
City,19 as no court could compel the City to pay her any damages that a 
court may have awarded her.20 
The competing opinions in Gorman reveal the deep disagreement over 
the application of the Direct Action Statute within the Louisiana Supreme 
Court, among the lower courts, and between the state and federal courts. The 
majority and the dissent differed substantially on the resolution of the 
following three issues: (1) whether the Direct Action Statute grants a 
                                                                                                             
Insured and reported to us in writing during the policy period . . . .”) (emphasis in 
original). 
 12. Id. at 891. 
 13. Gorman v. City of Opelousas, No. 12-1468, 2013 WL 1831075, at *3 (La. 
Ct. App. 3d May 1, 2013), rev’d, 148 So. 3d 888 (La. 2014). 
 14. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 898 (“The City’s failure to report Gorman’s claim 
to Lexington during the applicable policy period as required precludes coverage. 
Absent coverage, Gorman was not deprived of a right under the Direct Action 
Statute.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Murray v. City of Bunkie, 686 So. 2d 45, 50 (La. Ct. App. 3d 
1996) (finding that the notice requirement in a claims-made-and-reported policy 
was unenforceable); but see Reichert v. Bertucci, 650 So. 2d 821, 823 (La. Ct. 
App. 4th 1995) (finding that the notice requirement in a claims-made-and-
reported policy did not violate public policy). 
 16. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 895–96 (citing Hood v. Cotter, 5 So. 3d 819, 829 
(La. 2008)). The majority asserted that the Direct Action Statute confers “a 
procedural right of action,” allowing an injured third person to sue the tortfeasor’s 
insurer directly. Id. at 896. The dissent argued that the Direct Action Statute 
bestows on injured third persons a substantive cause of action against the 
tortfeasor’s insurer. See id. at 898 (Knoll, J., dissenting). 
 17. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269(B)(1) (2009). 
 18. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 898. 
 19. Motion to Dismiss, Gorman v. City of Opelousas, No. 10-C-4849-D (La. 
Dist. Ct. Sept. 29, 2014). 
 20. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10(C); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5109(B)(2) (2012) 
(“Any judgment rendered in any suit filed against . . . a political subdivision . . . 
shall be exigible, payable, and paid only . . . out of funds appropriated for that 
purpose by the named political subdivision . . . .”). 
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substantive right to an injured plaintiff;21 (2) whether the distinction between 
occurrence policies and claims-made-and-reported policies is relevant to the 
outcome of the case;22 and (3) whether the notice requirement in a claims-
made-and-reported policy violates the public policy considerations 
underlying the Direct Action Statute.23 The prior cases that applied the 
Direct Action Statute are not uniform in their answers, and unfortunately 
Gorman’s reasoning fails to adequately settle these issues. 
Because Gorman’s reasoning is insufficient, this Comment will 
explain how the Court should have resolved these three contentious issues 
by analyzing how prior courts have applied the Direct Action Statute and 
the public policy considerations inherent in that law. Part I of this 
Comment will clarify the history behind Louisiana’s Direct Action Statute 
and explain how the courts have historically interpreted that law. Part II 
will discuss the facts behind Ms. Gorman’s lawsuit, the procedural history, 
and the Supreme Court’s ultimate holding in Gorman. Part III will analyze 
the majority and dissenting opinions in Gorman and discuss what the 
correct outcome should have been in light of the relevant jurisprudence 
and public policy. Part IV will propose a legislative solution to rectify the 
injustice of the majority’s overly broad holding. This proposed legislation 
will amend the Insurance Code to prohibit insurance companies from 
issuing claims-made-and-reported policies24 to political subdivisions of 
the state, so that these political subdivisions cannot avoid liability by 
                                                                                                             
 21. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 895–96 (citing Hood, 5 So. 3d at 829). The 
majority contended that the Direct Action Statute does not confer any substantive 
rights on an injured third person. Id. The dissent argued that the Direct Action 
Statute gives an injured third person a substantive right against the insurer that 
vests at the time of injury. Id. at 900 (Knoll, J., dissenting). 
 22. Id. at 897. The majority believed that extending coverage under the 
Lexington policy to Ms. Gorman’s claims would transform “the City’s claims-
made-and-reported policy into an occurrence policy.” Id. at 897 (citing Hood, 5 
So. 3d at 830). The dissent maintained that the result of this case should be the 
same under an occurrence policy or a claims-made-and-reported policy. Id. at 903 
(Knoll, J., dissenting) (citing Murray v. City of Bunkie, 686 So. 2d 45, 50 (La. Ct. 
App. 3d 1996)). For an explanation of the distinctions between occurrence 
policies and claims-made-and-reported policies, see discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
 23. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 898. The majority reasoned that the notice 
requirement “in a claims-made-and-reported policy [is] not per se impermissible 
as against public policy.” Id. The dissent insisted that Lexington’s “notice 
requirement derogates from the public policy behind our Direct Action statute 
[sic].” Id. at 901 (Knoll, J., dissenting). 
 24. “A [claims-made-and-reported] policy is triggered if: 1) the [insured’s 
tortious act or omission] . . . took place after the applicable [retroactive] date; and 
2) during the policy period, a) the victim made a claim against the insured; and b) 
the insured reported the claim to the insurer.” Bob Works, Excusing Nonoccurrence 
of Insurance Policy Conditions in Order to Avoid Disproportionate Forfeiture: 
Claims-Made Formats as a Test Case, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 505, 530 (1999). 
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failing to report claims. As long as the injury occurs during the policy 
period or the injured plaintiff files a claim during the policy period, victims 
will be assured that coverage exists for a political subdivision’s negligent 
actions.25 
I. HISTORY OF THE DIRECT ACTION STATUTE 
The cases interpreting the Direct Action Statute echo the Supreme 
Court’s disagreement over the resolution of the three issues in Gorman.26 
The history of the Direct Action Statute places into perspective the 
divisions among the Gorman opinions. The public policy considerations 
that motivated the Direct Action Statute’s passage and the evolution of the 
jurisprudential interpretation of the law help to determine how the Gorman 
Court should have answered the three issues presented. 
A. The Legislature Seeks to Protect the Public from Insolvent Tortfeasors 
Prior to the creation of the Direct Action Statute, Louisiana courts 
regularly enforced insurance policies as written,27 rather than endeavoring 
to interpret them in favor of injured third persons.28 Taking advantage of 
this formalism, insurance companies drafted their policies in favorable 
terms and often inserted “no action” clauses into their policies.29 Under 
these clauses, the insurance company would pay its insured only if the 
insured first paid the injured plaintiff the amount that the court awarded.30 
Predictably, these policies harmed plaintiffs. If insolvent or bankrupt, 
the insured tortfeasor could not pay damages to the plaintiff.31 Because the 
insured tortfeasor could not pay the plaintiff, the insurer owed no money 
to its insured under the policy.32 Thus, an injured plaintiff could not collect 
                                                                                                             
 25. See WILLIAM SHELBY MCKENZIE & H. ALSTON JOHNSON, III, INSURANCE 
LAW AND PRACTICE § 6:25, in 15 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 593 (4th ed. 
2012). 
 26. See, e.g., Hood, 5 So. 3d 819; West v. Monroe Bakery, Inc., 46 So. 2d 
122 (La. 1950); Murray, 686 So. 2d 45; see also discussion infra Part III. 
 27. See Alston Johnson, The Louisiana Direct Action Statute, 43 LA. L. REV. 
1455, 1456 (1983). If a court found that an insured tortfeasor was liable to an 
individual, the tortfeasor’s insurance company indemnified the tortfeasor for the 
amount that the tortfeasor had to pay the injured plaintiff. See id. at 1456–57. 
 28. See, e.g., Provost v. Homes by Lawrence & Pauline, Inc., 103 So. 3d 
1280, 1282 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2012); Love v. Sirey, 119 So. 3d 732, 736 (La. Ct. 
App. 5th 2013). 
 29. Johnson, supra note 27, at 1457. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. The courts, believing that “an insurance contract provided indemnification 
for loss by the insured rather than coverage of the liability of an insured to a third 
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his award from the defendant or the defendant’s insurer, and was left 
without a remedy.33 
The Louisiana legislature sought to fix this problem in 1918 when it 
passed Act 253, the first incarnation of the Direct Action Statute.34 This 
Act required insurance policies to stipulate that the insurance company 
must pay an injured plaintiff the damages for which a court held its insured 
liable, regardless of whether the insured tortfeasor was insolvent or 
bankrupt.35 The Act also granted injured plaintiffs the right to sue the 
tortfeasor’s insurer directly under the policy’s terms, but only if the 
tortfeasor was insolvent or bankrupt.36 This right of direct action, although 
limited to situations where the tortfeasor was unable to pay the court-
awarded damages, incorporated public policy considerations into the 
insurance contract itself.37 Despite the revolutionary nature of this statute, 
no court had occasion to interpret the new law for 11 years.38  
In 1929, the Orleans Court of Appeal39 finally rendered an opinion 
interpreting the Direct Action Statute.40 In Edwards v. Fidelity & Casualty 
Co. of New York,41 the insurance company claimed it was not liable to the 
plaintiff, because the insured tortfeasor had neither notified the insurance 
company of the accident as required under the policy nor been judicially 
declared insolvent or bankrupt.42 The court disagreed, holding that, 
although the insured’s failure to notify his insurer of the accident deprived 
the insured of the right to be reimbursed, the plaintiff was not barred from 
suing the insurer to recover the judgment that the insured owed him.43 In 
addition to interpreting Act 253 of 1918 as granting an injured plaintiff a 
substantive cause of action against the insurance company, the court noted 
                                                                                                             
person,” treated these policies as indemnity policies rather than modern insurance 
policies. Id. at 1456. 
 33. Id. at 1457. 
 34. Act No. 253, 1918 La. Acts 461. Insurance companies that issued policies 
contrary to this law were forced to pay a fine, and failure to comply with the 
statute was considered a misdemeanor offense. Id. at 462. In the current version 
of the Direct Action Statute, the legislature has eliminated these penalties in favor 
of reading the statute into nonconforming policies. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
22:1269 (2009). 
 35. Act No. 253, 1918 La. Acts 461, 461. 
 36. Id. at 461–62. 
 37. Johnson, supra note 27, at 1457. 
 38. Id. at 1458. 
 39. The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal is the successor court of 
the Orleans Court of Appeal. See Williams v. Lemaire, 655 So. 2d 765, 768 (La. 
Ct. App. 4th 1995). 
 40. See Edwards v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 123 So. 162 (La. Ct. App. 
Orleans 1929). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 163. 
 43. Id. 
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that the Direct Action Statute controlled the interpretation of insurance 
policies with respect to injured third persons.44 In passing the Direct Action 
Statute, the court believed the legislature intended for insured tortfeasors to 
be statutorily presumed insolvent or bankrupt if an injured third person was 
unable to execute a judgment against the insured.45 
B. Amendments and Jurisprudential Interpretations Further Public 
Policy Considerations 
In response to the Orleans Court of Appeal’s decision in Edwards, the 
legislature amended Act 253 of 1918 the following year.46 In Act 55 of 
1930, the legislature essentially adopted the Edwards rationale that a 
judgment of insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured tortfeasor was not 
required for the injured plaintiff to sue the insurer,47 because the original 
version of the statute—which required that the insured tortfeasor be either 
insolvent or bankrupt—was silent as to whether such a judgment was 
necessary.48 The amended statute also granted injured plaintiffs the ability 
to sue the insurer directly without also having to sue the insured 
tortfeasor.49  
Although the legislature appeared to reject the holding in Edwards that 
the statute created a substantive right,50 not all courts agreed that the statute 
only granted a procedural right.51 Courts did, however, uniformly protect 
                                                                                                             
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 163–64. 
 46. Act No. 55, 1930 La. Acts 122; see Johnson, supra note 27, at 1459. 
 47. Act No. 55, 1930 La. Acts 122, 123 (“[A]ny judgment which may be 
rendered against the assured, for which the insurer is liable, which shall have 
become executory, shall be deemed prima facie evidence of the insolvency of the 
assured . . . .”); Edwards, 123 So. at 164 (“It is our opinion that . . . an unsatisfied 
execution, was intended to be . . . proof of the . . . [insured’s] insolvency or 
bankruptcy.”); Johnson, supra note 27, at 1460. 
 48. See Act No. 253, 1918 La. Acts 461; see also Edwards, 123 So. at 163–
64. 
 49. Act No. 55, 1930 La. Acts 122, 123 (“Provided further that the injured 
person or his or her heirs, at their option, shall have a right of direct action against 
the insurer company within the terms, and limits of the policy . . . and said action 
may be brought either against the insurer company alone or against both the 
assured and the insurer company, jointly and in solido.”). 
 50. See id. The amended law’s statement that the plaintiff’s “right of direct 
action against the insurer” was “within the terms, and limits of the policy” 
indicated that the statute granted a procedural right, rather than a substantive one. 
Id.; see also Rossville Commercial Alcohol Corp. v. Dennis Sheen Transfer Co., 
138 So. 183, 188 (La. Ct. App. Orleans 1931). 
 51. See West v. Monroe Bakery, Inc., 46 So. 2d 122, 123 (La. 1950) (“An 
analysis of our jurisprudence . . . discloses that with two exceptions Act 55 of 1930 
has been treated consistently as conferring substantive rights on third parties . . . .”) 
(emphasis in original). 
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injured persons by interpreting the Direct Action Statute as overriding policy 
language that prohibited a suit against the insurer unless the injured person 
obtained a judicial declaration that the insured was insolvent.52 According to 
the courts, public policy required that the statute, which superseded any 
contrary provisions in an insurance policy, be read into an insurance policy.53  
In 1942, the Supreme Court announced an important jurisprudential 
interpretation of the public policy behind the Direct Action Statute.54 In 
Davies v. Consolidated Underwriters,55 the Court held that the insurer was 
“not deprived of any substantial right” by the injured plaintiff’s suit even 
though the insurer did not receive satisfactory notice from its insured.56 The 
Court explained that the Direct Action Statute embodied the public policy that 
liability policies are intended to protect the public rather than the insured 
tortfeasor.57 
This public policy consideration, which numerous cases have since 
reiterated,58 illustrates how courts interpret insurance contracts differently 
than other contracts in Louisiana.59 Under the Direct Action Statute, courts 
read public policy considerations into insurance contracts.60 Whereas 
courts generally interpret most contracts in light of the parties’ common 
intent,61 insurance contracts, which are issued “for the benefit of all injured 
persons . . . to whom the insured is liable,” are interpreted in favor of third 
parties.62 Public policy, as embodied in the Direct Action Statute, further 
protects an injured plaintiff’s right of direct action by prohibiting 
insurance policies from limiting that right to less than a year after the date 
                                                                                                             
 52. See Rambin v. S. Sales Co., 145 So. 46, 50 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1932). 
 53. See id.; Webb v. Zurich Ins. Co., 205 So. 2d 398, 408 (La. 1967). 
 54. Davies v. Consol. Underwriters, 6 So. 2d 351 (La. 1942). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 357. 
 57. Id. (“[Act No. 55 of 1930] expresses the public policy of this State that 
an insurance policy against liability is not issued primarily for the protection of 
the insured but for the protection of the public.”). 
 58. See, e.g., Gorman v. City of Opelousas, 148 So. 3d 888, 894 (La. 2014) 
(citing West v. Monroe Bakery, Inc., 46 So. 2d 122, 129–30 (La. 1950)); 
Holtzclaw v. Falco, Inc., 355 So. 2d 1279, 1281 (La. 1977) (quoting Davies, 6 So. 
2d at 357). The legislature has codified Davies’ interpretation of Louisiana’s 
public policy into the Direct Action Statute. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
22:1269(D) (2009) (“[A]ll liability policies within their terms and limits are 
executed for the benefit of all injured persons and their survivors or heirs to whom 
the insured is liable . . . .”). 
 59. See MCKENZIE & JOHNSON, supra note 25, § 2:6, at 74–75. 
 60. See id. 
 61. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2045 (2015). 
 62. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269(D) (2009); see MCKENZIE & JOHNSON, 
supra note 25, § 2:6, at 74–75. 
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the plaintiff’s cause of action arose.63 Thus, the Direct Action Statute and 
public policy play a vital role in a court’s interpretation of an insurance 
contract. 
In 1948, the legislature compiled the existing statutes regarding 
insurance into an Insurance Code64 and slightly tweaked the Direct Action 
Statute in an attempt to aid federal courts in determining how the Direct 
Action Statute affected out-of-state policies.65 In 1950, the legislature 
reenacted the statute as Louisiana Revised Statutes section 22:655 and 
added the following sentence to the law: “This right of direct action shall 
exist whether the policy of insurance sued upon was written or delivered in 
the State of Louisiana . . . provided the accident occurred within the State of 
Louisiana.”66 The legislature added this provision to provide further 
guidance to federal courts that were still uncertain how the Direct Action 
Statute impacted out-of-state insurance policies.67 Seventeen years later, 
however, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Webb v. Zurich Insurance Co.68 
determined that as long as either “the policy was issued or delivered in 
Louisiana or if the accident or injury occurred in Louisiana,”69 the injured 
plaintiff could invoke the Direct Action Statute to sue the tortfeasor’s 
insurer.70 Although the Webb Court’s interpretation of the legislative 
intent is flawed under the plain language of the statute,71 which states that 
the accident must occur in Louisiana for the plaintiff to sue the tortfeasor’s 
insurer,72 this jurisprudential reading of the Direct Action Statute 
                                                                                                             
 63. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:868(B) (“No insurance contract delivered or 
issued for delivery in this state . . . shall contain any condition, stipulation, or 
agreement limiting [the] right of action against the insurer . . . to a period of less 
than one year from the time when the cause of action accrues . . . .”). 
 64. Act No. 195, 1948 La. Acts 140, 141. 
 65. Johnson, supra note 27, at 1463–64. The Direct Action Statute, as it was 
codified in 1948, began by stating that “[n]o policy or contract of liability 
insurance shall be issued or delivered in this State,” and the opening reference to 
the illegality of policies not in conformity with the statute was deleted. Act No. 
195, 1948 La. Acts 140, 141. 
 66. Act No. 541, 1950 La. Acts 985, 986. 
 67. Johnson, supra note 27, at 1463–64. 
 68. 205 So. 2d 398 (La. 1967). 
 69. Johnson, supra note 27, at 1464 (citing Webb, 205 So. 2d 398). 
 70. Webb, 205 So. 2d at 406. The Supreme Court based its interpretation of 
the legislature’s intent on a vetoed bill that would have removed the phrase 
“provided the accident or injury occurred within the State of Louisiana.” Id. at 
404–05. 
 71. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269(B)(2) (2009); Johnson, supra note 
27, at 1477 (“The most charitable thing that can be said of the [Webb Court’s] 
opinion is that it announced what the writing justice believed the legislature ‘must 
have meant’ or ‘could have enacted’ as opposed to the meaning to be derived from 
the plain language of the enactment.” (footnote omitted)). 
 72. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269(B)(2); Act No. 541, 1950 La. Acts 985, 
986. 
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illustrates how the courts tended to read the statute broadly to extend 
statutory coverage to the claims of injured plaintiffs.73 
Since Webb, the legislature has amended the statute several times, but 
only a few of these amendments are relevant to the analysis of the Gorman 
decision. In 1956, the legislature codified the public policy articulated in 
Davies that liability policies were intended to protect injured persons.74 The 
1988 revision modified the right of direct action by preventing the plaintiff 
from suing the insurer unless the plaintiff also sues the insured tortfeasor as 
a co-defendant.75 The legislature, however, listed several exceptions to this 
general rule.76 For example, if the insured tortfeasor is bankrupt or insolvent, 
the injured plaintiff can sue the tortfeasor’s insurer without having to join 
the tortfeasor in the suit.77 The most recent relevant modification of the 
Direct Action Statute came in 2008, when the law was reenacted without 
any substantive changes as Louisiana Revised Statutes section 22:1269 as 
part of a revision of the Insurance Code.78 A few years after this revision, 
Mr. Armstrong’s death due to the City’s negligence gave the Supreme 
Court an opportunity to further the public policy behind the Direct Action 
Statute in Gorman. 
II. DEATH IN THE CITY: FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF 
GORMAN V. CITY OF OPELOUSAS 
Shortly after the police arrested Mr. Armstrong for drunkenly disrupting 
an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting,79 they placed him in what they referred 
to as the “drunk tank”—“an eight-foot by eight-foot cinderblock room” with 
a dense metal door and no functioning lights.80 Mr. Armstrong was so 
intoxicated that the police had to carry him to the drunk tank,81 and when 
three other men were placed in the cell with him, he was lying face down 
on the floor.82 Six hours passed before the officer on duty checked on the 
inmates.83 In the meantime, two of the inmates began savagely kicking Mr. 
                                                                                                             
 73. See, e.g., Versai Mgmt. Corp. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. 11-2717, 
2012 WL 1118669, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 2, 2012) (citing Webb, 205 So. 2d at 406); 
Spomer v. Aggressor Int’l, Inc., 807 So. 2d 267, 277–78 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2001). 
 74. Act No. 475, 1956 La. Acts 927, 928. 
 75. Act No. 934, 1988 La. Acts 2448, 2448–49. 
 76. Id. at 2449. 
 77. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269(B)(1)(a)–(b). 
 78. See id. § 22:1269; Act No. 415, 2008 La. Acts 1846, 1846, 1889. 
 79. State v. King, 124 So. 3d 623, 625 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2013). 
 80. Id. at 625–26. 
 81. Id. at 625. 
 82. Id. at 626. 
 83. Id. The officer testified that he thought he would be able to hear if there 
were any “excessively loud” sounds emanating from Mr. Armstrong’s cell, even 
though a hallway and a steel door stood between his desk and the cell. Id. 
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Armstrong, mutilating his head, neck, sides, and groin.84 The fourth inmate 
in the cell repeatedly pounded the cell door and pleaded for someone to 
save Mr. Armstrong, but the officer on duty heard nothing.85 By the time 
the officer checked on the inmates, Mr. Armstrong was dead.86 
One day before the anniversary of her son’s death, Ms. Gorman sued 
the City87 under wrongful death and survival actions.88 In December 2010, 
Ms. Gorman requested the name of the City’s liability insurer.89 The City 
failed to answer.90 When the trial court granted Ms. Gorman’s motion to 
compel an answer in June 2011,91 the City ignored the court order.92 Three 
days before a hearing on whether the court should sanction the City’s 
attorneys for not complying with the court’s order to compel an answer,93 
the City finally told Ms. Gorman that its insurer was Lexington Insurance 
Company.94 Ms. Gorman then amended her petition and named Lexington 
as a defendant.95 Unfortunately, the City’s answer to Ms. Gorman’s 
request arrived too late to save her claims against its insurer.96 
Lexington, finally served with Ms. Gorman’s petition on September 
22, 2011,97 moved for summary judgment against the City and Ms. 
Gorman.98 Lexington argued that no coverage existed under the policy 
because the City did not notify it of Ms. Gorman’s claim during the policy 
                                                                                                             
 84. Id. at 626–27. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 626. 
 87. Gorman v. City of Opelousas, 148 So. 3d 888, 890 (La. 2014). Ms. 
Gorman also sued the two inmates who killed her son. Id. at 890 n.1.  
 88. Id. at 890. Ms. Gorman’s wrongful death and survival actions would have 
prescribed had she waited another two days to file them. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 
2315.1(A), 2315.2(B) (2015). 
 89. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 890. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Plaintiff’s/Appellant’s Original Brief at 3, Gorman v. City of Opelousas, 
No. 12-1468, 2013 WL 1831075 (La. Ct. App. 3d May 1, 2013). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 890. 
 95. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269 (2009); Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 890. 
The Direct Action Statute gives injured plaintiffs the ability to directly sue the 
tortfeasor’s insurer as a co-defendant of the tortfeasor. See Anderson v. Ichinose, 
760 So. 2d 302, 307 (La. 1999) (“The Direct Action Statute affords a victim the 
right to sue the insurer directly when the liability policy covers a certain risk. The 
statute does not, however, extend the protection of the liability policy to risks that 
were not covered by the policy or were excluded thereby (at least in the absence 
of some mandatory coverage provisions in other statutes).”). 
 96. See Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 890–91. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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period,99 as required under the City’s claims-made-and-reported policy.100 
Under a claims-made-and-reported policy, the insurance company is not 
liable for any damages caused by the insured, unless three conditions are 
met.101 First, the negligent act for which the insured is liable must occur 
after a specified retroactive date.102 Second, the injured party must file a 
claim against the insured during the policy period.103 Finally, the insured 
must report the claim to the insurance company before the end of the 
policy period.104 The claims-made-and-reported policy differs from an 
occurrence policy, which does not require the insured to provide the 
insurer with notice of the claim during the policy period, but rather only 
requires that the negligent act take place during the policy period.105  
The distinction between these two types of policies played a role in 
the trial court’s ruling on Lexington’s motion for summary judgment.106 
The trial court determined that no coverage existed under Lexington’s 
policy, reasoning that holding Lexington liable for Ms. Gorman’s claim 
against the City would transform the claims-made-and-reported policy at 
issue into an occurrence policy.107 In effect, ignoring the notice requirement 
in the City’s policy would destroy “the bargained for exchange” between 
the parties to the contract.108 Thus, the trial court deemed Ms. Gorman’s 
                                                                                                             
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 890, 900 (Lexington’s policy stated that “COVERAGE IS LIMITED 
GENERALLY TO LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS FIRST MADE AGAINST YOU 
AND REPORTED IN WRITING TO US WHILE THE COVERAGE IS IN 
FORCE . . . .”). The policy period at issue began on April 17, 2010, and extended 
to April 17, 2011. Id. at 891. The policy applied retroactively to any actions—
dating back to April 17, 2005—for which the City’s police department may have 
been liable, including Mr. Armstrong’s death, which occurred in September 2009. 
Id. at 890–91. 
 101. Works, supra note 24, at 530. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. MCKENZIE & JOHNSON, supra note 25, § 6:25, at 593. 
 106. Gorman v. City of Opelousas, 148 So. 3d 888, 891 (La. 2014). 
 107. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 891; see FDIC v. Caplan, 838 F. Supp. 1125, 1131 
n.11 (W.D. La. 1993) (“[U]nder [an occurrence] policy, liability is triggered when 
injury or damage occurs during the policy period.” (citing FDIC v. Barham, 794 
F. Supp. 187, 193 n.10 (W.D. La. 1991), aff’d, 995 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1993))).  
 108. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 891; see also LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2045, 2046 
(2015); Peterson v. Schimek, 729 So. 2d 1024, 1028 (La. 1999) (“The role of the 
judiciary in interpreting insurance contracts is to ascertain the common intent of 
the insured and insurer as reflected by the words in the policy. When the words of 
an insurance contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, 
courts must enforce the contract as written and may make no further interpretation 
in search of the parties’ intent.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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efforts to obtain the identity of the City’s insurer prior to April 17, 2011, 
the date the policy period ended, irrelevant.109 
Ms. Gorman appealed this decision to the Third Circuit.110 The Third 
Circuit reversed and determined that coverage existed for Ms. Gorman’s 
claim, reasoning that the insured’s failure to satisfy the notice requirement 
did not deprive the plaintiff of the ability to sue the insurer.111 The Third 
Circuit analogized this case to Murray v. City of Bunkie,112 where the Third 
Circuit had previously found that an injured third person was covered 
under a claims-made-and-reported policy issued to the city of Bunkie.113 
In that case, the court held that the Direct Action Statute granted injured 
plaintiffs a substantive right “that could not be taken away because of the 
insured’s failure to notify the insurer—a condition over which the plaintiff 
had no control.”114 Thus, the Third Circuit found that Ms. Gorman’s 
inability to ascertain the identity of the City’s insurer during the policy 
period did not deprive her of a substantive right.115 
Lexington appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking to have the trial 
court’s ruling reinstated.116 The Court granted certiorari and addressed the 
following three issues: (1) whether the Direct Action Statute grants an 
injured plaintiff a substantive right against the tortfeasor’s insurer; (2) 
whether a claims-made-and-reported-policy affects the injured plaintiff’s 
claim against the tortfeasor’s insurer differently than would an occurrence 
policy; and (3) whether the notice requirement in Lexington’s policy to the 
City is enforceable against Ms. Gorman so as to preclude coverage for her 
claim.117 
Ultimately, the Court divided four to three in its resolution of all three 
issues.118 First, the majority, relying primarily on one recent case, held that 
the Direct Action Statute grants injured third persons only a procedural 
right of action to sue the tortfeasor’s insurer.119 Second, the majority found 
                                                                                                             
 109. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 891. 
 110. Gorman v. City of Opelousas, No. 12-1468, 2013 WL 1831075, at *3 (La. 
Ct. App. 3d May 1, 2013), rev’d, 148 So. 3d 888 (La. 2014). The City also 
appealed the trial court’s ruling, id. at *1, *3, but its arguments for why coverage 
existed are not relevant to the analysis of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision. 
 111. Id. 
 112. 686 So. 2d 45 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1996). 
 113. Gorman, 2013 WL 1831075, at *3 (citing Murray, 686 So. 2d 45). 
 114. Id. (quoting Murray, 686 So. 2d at 49). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Gorman v. City of Opelousas, 148 So. 3d 888, 892 (La. 2014). 
 117. Id. at 892, 895–98. 
 118. Justice Knoll’s dissenting opinion was joined by Chief Justice Johnson 
and Justice Hughes. Id. at 903. 
 119. Id. at 895–96. The majority reasoned that the plaintiff’s “substantive 
cause of action against the insured” did not extend to the insurance company. Id.; 
see also infra Part III.A.1. 
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that a claims-made-and-reported policy affects an injured third person’s 
claim against the tortfeasor’s insurer differently than an occurrence policy 
does.120 Finally, the majority held that the notice requirement in this policy 
was enforceable because the Court had previously held that notice 
requirements in claims-made-and-reported policies did not violate the 
public policy underlying the Direct Action Statute.121 Thus, Ms. Gorman 
could not recover any damages from Lexington. 
In contrast, Justice Knoll’s dissenting opinion came to the opposite 
conclusion on all three of the major issues in this case. First, Justice Knoll 
contended that the Direct Action Statute gives an injured third person a 
substantive right of action against the insurer that is bestowed at the time 
of injury.122 Next, Justice Knoll argued that the case should be resolved 
the same way as it would under an occurrence policy, because the notice 
requirement in a claims-made-and-reported policy infringed upon the 
plaintiff’s substantive right of direct action against the insurer.123 Lastly, 
Justice Knoll determined that the trigger of Lexington’s policy was 
unenforceable, as it violated the public policy considerations inherent in 
the Direct Action Statute.124 Thus, the reasoning of the majority and 
dissenting opinions is irreconcilable. 
III. DISSECTING GORMAN’S UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
DIRECT ACTION STATUTE 
Both the majority and the dissent relied on prior Supreme Court 
interpretations of the Direct Action Statute.125 The two opinions, however, 
reached opposite conclusions on all three issues presented in the case. The 
reasoning of both opinions is insufficient, and neither opinion convincingly 
explains why the other’s application of the Direct Action Statute is wrong. 
Applying public policy considerations and prior jurisprudential interpretations 
                                                                                                             
 120. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 897 (extending coverage under the Lexington 
policy to Ms. Gorman’s claims would transform “the claims-made-and-reported 
policy into an occurrence policy”); see also infra Part III.B.1. 
 121. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 895, 898 (citing Livingston Parish Sch. Bd. v. 
Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. Co., 282 So. 2d 478, 482–83 (La. 1973)); see also infra 
Part III.C.1. 
 122. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 900 (Knoll, J., dissenting) (citing Edwards v. Fid. & 
Cas. Co. of N.Y., 123 So. 162, 163 (La. Ct. App. Orleans 1929); West v. Monroe 
Bakery, Inc., 46 So. 2d 122, 123, 127 (La. 1950)); see also infra Part III.A.1. 
 123. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 903 (Knoll, J., dissenting) (citing Murray v. City 
of Bunkie, 686 So. 2d 45, 50 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1996)); see also infra Part III.B.1. 
 124. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 901 (Knoll, J., dissenting); see also infra Part 
III.C.1. 
 125. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 897 (majority opinion) (citing Hood v. Cotter, 5 So. 
3d at 830 (La. 2008)); id. at 900 (Knoll, J., dissenting) (citing West, 46 So. 2d at 123, 
127). 
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of the Direct Action Statute to this case reveals how Gorman’s two factions 
understood—or misunderstood—the Direct Action Statute. 
A. Does the Direct Action Statute Grant a Procedural or Substantive 
Right? 
One fundamental issue on which the majority and dissent disagree is 
whether the Direct Action Statute grants a procedural or substantive right. 
This determination is significant because, if Ms. Gorman’s right of direct 
action against Lexington was a procedural right, her ability to sue 
Lexington for her son’s death would depend solely on whether the City 
had complied with the policy’s notice requirement.126 If the right was 
substantive, however, the notice requirement would be unenforceable 
because a plaintiff cannot be deprived of a vested substantive right.127 
Ultimately, the majority correctly recognized that the right was procedural, 
a view that comports with both the legislative intent behind the revision of 
the Direct Action Statute after Edwards128 and the past 60 years of 
jurisprudence.129 
1. The Gorman Opinions Rely on Jurisprudence to Come to Different 
Conclusions 
Ms. Gorman’s attorney argued before the Supreme Court that Ms. 
Gorman’s substantive right to sue Lexington under the Direct Action 
Statute vested at the moment that her son was killed.130 Relying heavily on 
its previous decision in Hood v. Cotter,131 the Gorman majority determined 
that the Direct Action Statute merely bestows a procedural right of action 
on the plaintiff against the tortfeasor’s insurer.132 Thus, the plaintiff’s 
substantive cause of action remains against the tortfeasor alone, and the 
plaintiff’s right of action against the tortfeasor’s insurer is not a vested 
right.133 The majority declined to give a more in-depth analysis as to why 
the Direct Action Statute did not grant an injured third person a substantive 
                                                                                                             
 126. Id. at 895–96 (majority opinion). 
 127. Id. at 894. 
 128. Rossville Commercial Alcohol Corp. v. Dennis Sheen Transfer Co., 138 
So. 183, 188 (La. Ct. App. Orleans 1931). 
 129. See, e.g., Anderson v. Ichinose, 760 So. 2d 302, 305 (La. 1999); 
Livingston Parish Sch. Bd. v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. Co., 282 So. 2d 478, 481 
(La. 1973); Home Ins. Co. v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 62 So. 2d 828 (La. 
1952).  
 130. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 894. 
 131. 5 So. 3d 819 (La. 2008). 
 132. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 895–96 (citing Hood, 5 So. 3d at 829). 
 133. Id. at 896–97 (citing Hood, 5 So. 3d at 829). 
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right and did not address the dissent’s position.134 The majority’s refusal, 
however, to rebut the dissent’s position through a more thorough analysis 
of the jurisprudence leaves the reader without answers as to where the 
discrepancy in the jurisprudence arose or which position is correct. 
Writing for the dissent’s three justices, Justice Knoll vigorously 
disagreed with the majority’s statement that the Direct Action Statute 
merely granted a procedural right.135 Referring to the majority’s position 
as “legally erroneous,” Justice Knoll maintained that the Direct Action 
Statute bestowed a substantive right on injured third persons.136 Relying 
primarily on the holdings in Edwards and West v. Monroe Bakery,137 
Justice Knoll argued that at the moment Mr. Armstrong died, Ms. 
Gorman’s “substantive cause of action against the insured vested.”138 
Because the Direct Action Statute granted a substantive right to plaintiffs, 
according to Justice Knoll, the City’s failure to comply with the notice 
requirement in the policy could not deprive Ms. Gorman of her right of 
action against Lexington.139 The dissent, however, did not rely on a single 
Supreme Court case decided in the last 60 years,140 which suggests that the 
majority’s holding is in line with the Court’s more recent interpretations 
of the Direct Action Statute.  
2. The Supreme Court Has Interpreted the Direct Action Statute as 
Granting a Procedural Right for Over 60 Years 
No satisfactory answer exists in the Louisiana jurisprudence as to why 
the Supreme Court changed its opinion on the type of right the Direct Action 
Statute grants injured persons. Thankfully, the Mississippi Supreme Court, 
applying Louisiana law, has pointed out that the Louisiana Supreme Court 
case Home Insurance Co. v. Highway Insurer Underwriters141 “effectively 
overruled” West’s interpretation of the Direct Action Statute as bestowing a 
substantive right.142  
Interestingly, neither Louisiana courts nor legal scholars have treated 
Home Insurance as a landmark case. No Louisiana court has ever treated 
Home Insurance as overruling West’s interpretation of the Direct Action 
                                                                                                             
 134. See generally id. at 892–98. 
 135. See id. at 900 (Knoll, J., dissenting). 
 136. Id. 
 137. 46 So. 2d 122 (La. 1950); see also supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 138. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 900 (Knoll, J., dissenting). 
 139. Id. at 903. 
 140. Id. at 900–03. 
 141. 62 So. 2d 828 (La. 1952). 
 142. Ford v. State Farm Ins. Co., 625 So. 2d 792, 795 (Miss. 1993). 
Interestingly, Justice Moise authored the majority opinions in both West and 
Home Insurance. West, 46 So. 2d at 123; Home Ins., 62 So. 2d at 829. 
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Statute. Indeed, the Home Insurance opinion never mentions West.143 
Whatever its reasons for not referring to West, the Home Insurance Court 
clearly repudiated the conclusion of the former decision, stating 
unequivocally that the Direct Action Statute “is purely remedial and does 
not affect any substantial rights under the contract of insurance,”144 
whereas West had viewed the statute “as conferring substantive rights on 
[plaintiffs] . . . which become vested at the moment of the accident in 
which they are injured.”145 
Since Home Insurance was decided, the Supreme Court has 
consistently held that the Direct Action Statute is procedural in nature,146 
which appears to be in line with the legislative intent.147 The legislature, 
by amending the Direct Action Statute after Edwards,148 signified that the 
plaintiff’s right of direct action was intended to be a procedural right, 
rather than a substantive right.149 The legislature’s amendment stated that 
the injured plaintiff “shall have a right of direct action against the insurer 
company within the terms, and limits of the policy.”150 The legislature 
further stated that its intent for the plaintiff’s right to sue the insurer was 
to “be subject to all of the lawful conditions of the policy contract and the 
defenses which could be urged by the insurer to a direct action brought by 
the insured.”151 This language, which exists in the present version of the 
                                                                                                             
 143. See Home Ins., 62 So. 2d 828. 
 144. Id. at 831 (quoting Robbins v. Short, 165 So. 512, 514 (La. Ct. App. 1st 
1936)). The Court further noted that both Act 253 of 1918 and Act 55 of 1930 
“treat of provided remedies and not of contractual obligations; they are not 
restrictions of rights of action but are remedial enlargements and remedies of 
procedure to better insure recovery for an injured person.” Id. 
 145. West, 46 So. 2d at 123. 
 146. See, e.g., Cacamo v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 764 So. 2d 41, 43 (La. 
2000); Quinlan v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 575 So. 2d 336, 353 (La. 1991). 
Interestingly, Justice Hughes, who joined the Gorman dissent, authored an 
opinion in 2013 that held that the Direct Action Statute merely granted a 
procedural right of action to injured persons against the tortfeasor’s insurer. See 
Soileau v. Smith True Value & Rental, 144 So. 3d 771, 775–76 (La. 2013). 
 147. Home Ins., 62 So. 2d at 831 (“The Legislature evidently felt that our 
courts should not be made to become circumlocution officers winding and 
unwinding red tape, but . . . gave an interpretation of the provisions of Act No. 55 
of 1930, as amended, when it expressed its intent as to the limitation of the scope 
of operation on the remedial act.” (emphasis in original)). 
 148. See supra Part I.A–B. 
 149. Rossville Commercial Alcohol Corp. v. Dennis Sheen Transfer Co., 138 
So. 183, 188 (La. Ct. App. Orleans 1931) (“We feel that to give retrospective 
effect to the statute of 1930 would not have the effect of impairing the obligation 
of the insurance agreement . . . . Whether written before or after that statute was 
passed, [the insurance policy] is affected by it.”). Note that the judge who wrote 
Edwards also authored the Rossville opinion. Johnson, supra note 27, at 1461. 
 150. Act No. 55, 1930 La. Acts 122, 123. 
 151. Id. 
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Direct Action Statute,152 clearly signifies that the statute grants a procedural 
right, as the language limits the plaintiff’s right to sue the insurer to the rights 
that the tortfeasor has against his own insurer.153 Although the Supreme 
Court struggled with this concept initially,154 the Court has had a firm 
understanding of the legislative intent over the last 60 years.155 
Despite the Louisiana Supreme Court’s consistent interpretation of the 
Direct Action Statute over the past 60 years, confusion remains due to 
several Louisiana courts of appeal, as well as some federal courts, 
misinterpreting the law. Although many federal courts have interpreted the 
statute correctly,156 others have cited West to interpret the law as granting 
substantive rights.157 Recently, some courts of appeal have also ignored 
over 60 years of jurisprudence and relied on West, holding that the Direct 
Action Statute vests injured third persons with a substantive right.158 
Gorman’s holding, which abrogated these rulings, should quell the 
rumblings among the lower courts159 and will hopefully convince the 
federal courts to interpret the Direct Action Statute as bestowing a procedural 
right.160 
                                                                                                             
 152. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269(B)(1), 1269(C) (2009). 
 153. Johnson, supra note 27, at 1460–61 (“[T]he insurers apparently gained 
legislative sanction of the concept that this direct action was more a matter of 
procedure than of substance. The direct action was subject to all lawful conditions 
of the policy and the defenses which could be urged by the insurer to an action 
brought by the insured for indemnity. This could be seen as . . . an overruling of 
the holding in Edwards. . . . Indeed, there hardly could have been any other 
meaning to the amendment.”). 
 154. See West v. Monroe Bakery, Inc., 46 So. 2d 122, 131 (La. 1950) 
(McCaleb, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority fail to take in account that . . . [the 1930 
amendment to the Direct Action Statute] specifically restricted [the plaintiff’s] 
right and made it subject to all lawful conditions of the policy contract and to the 
defenses which could be urged by the insurer in a direct action brought by the 
insured.”). 
 155. See, e.g., Hood v. Cotter, 5 So. 3d 819, 827, 829 (La. 2008) (“[T]he Direct 
Action Statute does not extend any greater right to third party tort victims who 
were damaged by the insured. . . . The Direct Action Statute . . . grants a procedural 
right of action against an insurer where the plaintiff has a substantive cause of 
action against the insured.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 156. See, e.g., Authenment v. Ingram Barge Co., 878 F. Supp. 2d 672, 681 
(E.D. La. 2012). 
 157. See, e.g., Auster Oil & Gas, Inc., v. Stream, 891 F.2d 570, 577–78 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (citing West, 46 So. 2d at 123); In re Combustion, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 
1056, 1061 (W.D. La. 1997) (citing West, 46 So. 2d at 123). 
 158. See, e.g., Williams v. Lemaire, 655 So. 2d 765, 767–68 (La. Ct. App. 4th 
1995) (citing West, 46 So. 2d at 122); Murray v. City of Bunkie, 686 So. 2d 45, 
48–49 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1996) (citing Williams, 655 So. 2d at 767–68). 
 159. Gorman v. City of Opelousas, 148 So. 3d 888, 894–95, 898 (La. 2014). 
 160. Federal courts apply the Direct Action Statute under choice of law 
principles. Combustion, 960 F. Supp. at 1059 (“[T]he federal court applies the 
choice of law [rules] of the forum state [when exercising supplemental jurisdiction 
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B. How Does the Direct Action Statute Affect Claims-Made-and-
Reported Policies? 
The next issue on which the opinions differ is whether the Direct 
Action Statute affects claims-made-and-reported policies the same as 
occurrence policies. The resolution of this issue affects the Court’s ability 
to enforce the notice requirement in claims-made-and-reported policies. If 
the statute treats these two types of policies differently, then the notice 
requirement in claims-made-and-reported policies is enforceable, but if 
the statute treats claims-made-and-reported policies the same as 
occurrence policies, the notice requirement is not enforceable.161 The 
Gorman majority’s determination that the two types of policies must be 
treated differently was correct because these policies have different 
triggering events that must occur before the insured receives coverage,162 
and ignoring this difference would disregard “the bargained-for exchange 
between the insurer and the insured.”163 Thus, the majority correctly found 
that the notice provision in the City’s policy was enforceable. 
1. Gorman’s View on the Relevance of the Distinctions Between 
Occurrence Policies and Claims-Made-and-Reported Policies in 
Light of the Direct Action Statute 
The Gorman majority felt that the distinctions between occurrence 
policies and claims-made-and-reported policies impacted the outcome of 
the case.164 The Court distinguished West, which held that an insurer could 
not defeat coverage for the injured plaintiff’s claim by asserting that it had 
not received notice of the accident,165 by stating repeatedly that West dealt 
with an occurrence policy.166 The Court noted that only two of the policy’s 
                                                                                                             
over state law claims]. This Court will apply the Louisiana choice of law articles 
to determine the law or laws applicable to all claims filed under the Louisiana 
Direct Action Statute.” (internal citations omitted)). The Erie doctrine is not 
implicated in such situations, and any use of the terms “substantive” or 
“procedural” in this Note do not implicate Erie. See Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. 
v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (“‘[S]ubstance’ and ‘procedure’ are the same 
keywords to very different problems. . . . [T]he terms are in common use in 
connection with situations turning on such different considerations as . . . the 
enforcement of federal rights in the State courts and the multitudinous phases of 
the conflict of laws.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 161. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 162. MCKENZIE & JOHNSON, supra note 25, § 6:25, at 593; Works, supra note 
24, at 530. 
 163. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 896. 
 164. See id. at 894 n.10. 
 165. West v. Monroe Bakery, Inc., 46 So. 2d 122 (La. 1950). 
 166. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 894. 
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three requirements were met for the City to be insured for the claims Ms. 
Gorman was asserting.167 The Court further reasoned that finding coverage 
for Ms. Gorman’s claims under the policy would be impossible, as that 
finding would disrupt the common intent of the parties to the contract by 
treating their claims-made-and-reported policy as an occurrence policy.168  
In contrast, Justice Knoll’s dissent did not discuss the distinctions 
between occurrence policies and claims-made-and-reported policies 
because she believed that the distinctions were irrelevant; in her view, the 
Direct Action Statute bestowed a substantive right on plaintiffs that vested 
upon injury.169 Justice Knoll appeared to suggest that the purpose of the 
Direct Action Statute—to provide injured third persons with a remedy 
against the tortfeasor’s insurer170—should apply equally to both 
occurrence policies and claims-made-and-reported policies.171 In contrast 
to Justice Knoll’s dissent, the distinctions among the different types of 
insurance policies are important for determining whether coverage is 
triggered in a given case. The distinctions between occurrence policies and 
claims-made-and-reported policies, and why insurers prefer the latter to 
the former, help to explain the majority’s reticence to treat the City’s 
claims-made-and-reported policy the same as an occurrence policy. 
2. Coverage Under Different Types of Policies is Triggered in 
Different Manners 
The primary distinguishing factor among liability policies is the event 
that triggers coverage.172 Under an occurrence policy, coverage is 
                                                                                                             
 167. Id. at 893. 
 168. Id. at 897. 
 169. Id. at 903 (Knoll, J., dissenting) (“I ‘see no meaningful distinction 
between the loss of rights suffered by an injured third party for failure to give 
notice under an occurrence policy and the loss of rights suffered by an insured 
third party for failure to give notice under a “claims made” policy.’ In both 
instances, injured third parties become vested with rights under our Direct Action 
statute, and in both instances, the enforcement of the notice provisions would 
deprive injured third parties of their rights under the Direct Action statute when it 
was not within their power to give notice.” (quoting Murray v. City of Bunkie, 
686 So. 2d 45, 50 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1996))). 
 170. See Act No. 253, 1918 La. Acts 461; see also Johnson, supra note 27, at 
1457. 
 171. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 903 (Knoll, J., dissenting) (quoting Murray, 686 
So. 2d at 50). 
 172. See Works, supra note 24, at 514; see also David T. Grand, Jr., Comment, 
Nailing Down Occurrence Triggers for Property Damage in the Wake of 
Redevelopment—Why a Distinction Should Be Made Between First and Third 
Party Policies, 68 LA. L. REV. 605, 606 n.9 (2008) (“‘Trigger’ is a term used to 
describe what must happen, according to the terms of an insurance policy, for the 
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generally triggered if the injury takes place during the existence of the 
policy.173 For example, if the City’s policy was an occurrence policy, the 
City would have been covered against Ms. Gorman’s claims so long as her 
son was killed during the policy period, regardless of when her suit was 
filed or when the insurer was notified. Occurrence policies were the only 
type of policies that existed when professional liability companies came 
into existence.174 Insurance companies, however, could not adequately 
anticipate all of the claims that people would make after the policy period 
had ended from acts that occurred during the policy period, or the amount 
they would owe the claimant due to inflation.175 For this reason, insurance 
companies often lost more money than they made on occurrence 
policies.176 
Claims-made-and-reported policies developed in response to the 
disadvantages of occurrence policies.177 Claims-made-and-reported policies 
are more attractive to insurers because they provide more certainty—the 
insurer is not liable for any claims made or reported after the policy’s 
expiration date occurs.178 Insureds also benefit under claims-made-and-
reported policies by paying lower premiums and receiving coverage for 
acts that occurred after the policy’s “retroactive date,” which is a specified 
date, negotiated by the parties, that occurred before the policy period 
began.179 Coverage under this type of policy is only triggered if three 
prerequisites occur: (1) the injury or negligent act happens subsequent to 
the policy’s retroactive date, (2) the plaintiff files the claim against the 
insured before the policy expires, and (3) the insurer receives written 
notice of the claim from its insured before the policy expires.180 
                                                                                                             
potential of coverage to arise.” (citing Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal. v. Admiral 
Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 880 n.2 (Cal. 1995))). 
 173. MCKENZIE & JOHNSON, supra note 25, § 6:25, at 593. For a brief 
discussion of how some now-obsolete occurrence policies were triggered by an 
event other than injury, see Works, supra note 24, at 515 n.12. 
 174. Gerald Kroll, Comment, The “Claims Made” Dilemma in Professional 
Liability Insurance, 22 UCLA L. REV. 925, 926 (1975). 
 175. Id. at 926 n.7. 
 176. Id. at 926. 
 177. James F. Hogg, The Tale of a Tail, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 515, 518 
(1998). Note that Hogg’s article focuses on claims-made policies. Because 
claims-made-and-reported policies are a species of claims-made policies, his 
article is relevant here. 
 178. Kroll, supra note 174, at 928; Works, supra note 24, at 530. 
 179. Kroll, supra note 174, at 929 (citing Livingston Parish Sch. Bd. v. 
Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. Co., 282 So. 2d 478, 483 (La. 1973)); Works, supra note 
24, at 525–26. 
 180. Gorman v. City of Opelousas, 148 So. 3d 888, 892 (La. 2014); Works, 
supra note 24, at 530. 
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3. The Coverage for Which the Parties Bargained Determines the 
Insurer’s Obligation 
Prior to Gorman, the courts of appeal were split on the issue of whether, 
under the Direct Action Statute, the distinctions between occurrence policies 
and claims-made-and-reported policies mattered in determining whether 
coverage existed for an injured third person’s claims.181 The Fourth Circuit 
in Williams v. Lemaire182 and the Third Circuit in Murray treated a claims-
made-and-reported policy the same as an occurrence policy.183 But earlier 
decisions by both of these circuits,184 as well as the Fifth Circuit,185 have 
enforced the provisions of claims-made-and-reported policies differently 
than occurrence policies would be enforced in the same situations.186 
Although not mentioned by the Gorman Court, the Second Circuit has also 
determined that claims-made-and-reported policies are distinct from 
occurrence policies and, as such, should be treated differently.187 
This circuit split, however, is not justifiable in light of the holdings of 
the Supreme Court and similar decisions of other state courts. The 
Supreme Court has routinely distinguished claims-made-and-reported 
policies from occurrence policies ever since the Court first addressed this 
issue in 1973.188 One federal court, applying Louisiana’s Direct Action 
Statute, explained that an insurer of an occurrence policy cannot preclude 
coverage due to lack of notice because the injury triggers that policy.189 
                                                                                                             
 181. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269 (2009); Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 894–
95. 
 182. 655 So. 2d 765 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1995). 
 183. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 895; Murray v. City of Bunkie, 686 So. 2d 45, 50 
(La. Ct. App. 3d 1996); Williams, 655 So. 2d at 768. 
 184. See Reichert v. Bertucci, 650 So. 2d 821 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1995); see also 
Case v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 624 So. 2d 1285 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1993). 
 185. See Bank of La. v. Mmahat, Duffy, Opotowsky & Walker, 608 So. 2d 
218 (La. Ct. App. 5th 1992). 
 186. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 895; Reichert, 650 So. 2d at 823; Case, 624 So. 
2d at 1289; Mmahat, 608 So. 2d at 221. 
 187. See Lodwick, L.L.C. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 126 So. 3d 544 (La. Ct. 
App. 2d 2013). 
 188. See, e.g., Livingston Parish Sch. Bd. v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. Co., 282 
So. 2d 478, 481 (La. 1973) (“In [this claims-made-and-reported policy], the 
coverage is effective only if the negligent harm is discovered and reported within 
the policy term; this is to be contrasted with an ‘occurrence’ policy, where the 
coverage is effective if the negligent harm occurs within the policy period, 
regardless of the date of discovery.”); Anderson v. Ichinose, 760 So. 2d 302, 305 
(La. 1999) (“The major distinction between the ‘occurrence’ policy and the 
[claims-made-and-reported] policy constitutes the difference between the peril 
insured.” (quoting Sol Kroll, The Professional Liability Policy “Claims Made”, 
13 FORUM 842, 843 (1978))).  
 189. FDIC v. Caplan, 838 F. Supp. 1125, 1131 (W.D. La. 1993). 
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Thus, precluding coverage would interfere with the third party’s direct 
action against the insurer.190 In contrast, the court found that under a 
claims-made-and-reported policy the notice requirement “defines the 
insurer’s obligation, and thus the [third] party’s rights, under the law.”191 
Most courts in other states have also noted the importance of the 
distinctions between the triggers in the two types of policies.192 
Thus, the Gorman majority correctly concluded that distinguishing 
between claims-made-and-reported policies and occurrence policies is 
essential to the outcome of the case.193 In an occurrence policy, the injured 
plaintiff can sue the tortfeasor’s insurer as long as the injury occurred 
during the policy period; even if the plaintiff files the claim after the policy 
has expired, the insurance company is still liable.194 On the other hand, 
claims-made-and-reported policies only provide coverage if the injury 
occurs after the policy’s retroactive date, the plaintiff makes a claim 
against the tortfeasor during the policy period, and the tortfeasor notifies 
his insurer of the claim before the policy period expires.195 The Supreme 
Court correctly noted that finding that the City was insured against Ms. 
Gorman’s claims simply because her son died after the policy’s retroactive 
date would transform the City’s policy into an occurrence policy.196 The 
dissent’s refusal to distinguish the coverage triggers between occurrence 
policies and claims-made-and-reported policies suggests that the dissent 
may have simply been desperate to find coverage for Ms. Gorman.197 
                                                                                                             
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See, e.g., Textron, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 639 A.2d 1358, 1364 
(R.I. 1994) (“[I]n the case of a reporting requirement, which is typically found 
only in a claims-made-and-reported policy, the prescribed notification actually 
defines the scope of coverage provided by the policy, as the [notice] is the event 
that triggers coverage.” (citations omitted)); Prodigy Commc’ns Corp. v. Agric. 
Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 288 S.W.3d 374, 379–80 (Tex. 2009) (“Unlike 
occurrence policies . . . some claims-made policies (often called ‘claims-made-
and-reported’ policies) have an additional requirement that the claim be reported 
to the insurer within the policy period or within a specific number of days 
thereafter” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)). 
 193. Gorman v. City of Opelousas, 148 So. 3d 888, 894–95, 897 (La. 2014). 
 194. See id. at 894 (citing West v. Monroe Bakery, Inc., 46 So. 2d 122, 126, 
130 (La. 1950)); Kroll, supra note 174, at 925. 
 195. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 892. 
 196. Id. at 897. 
 197. See id. at 903 (Knoll, J., dissenting). 
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C. Does the Notice Requirement in the City’s Policy Violate Public 
Policy? 
The last issue on which the majority and the dissent disagree is whether 
the notice requirement in the City’s policy violates the public policy inherent 
in the Direct Action Statute. The determination of this issue affects Lexington’s 
liability. If the Court found that the notice requirement violated public policy, 
the City would be insured against Ms. Gorman’s claims, but if the notice 
requirement did not violate public policy, Ms. Gorman could not recover from 
Lexington because the City would not be covered. The majority concluded that 
Lexington’s notice requirement did not violate public policy.198 This finding, 
however, ignores the legislature’s intent in passing the Direct Action Statute199 
and the similarities between political subdivisions and insolvent insureds.200 
Thus, the Court should have held that claims-made-and-reported policies’ 
notice requirements violate public policy when those policies are issued to 
political subdivisions. 
1. Gorman Finds the City’s Policy Is Permissible Under the Direct 
Action Statute 
The majority relied on the Court’s prior decisions in Hood and Anderson 
v. Ichinose201 to determine that enforcing the notice requirement in claims-
made-and-reported policies does not per se violate public policy.202 The Court 
found its prior analysis in Hood relevant although the plaintiff in Hood filed a 
claim after the policy period expired, whereas Ms. Gorman filed her claim 
during the existence of the City’s policy.203 After noting that in some situations 
courts might deem the notice provision of a claims-made-and-reported 
policy unenforceable,204 the Court concluded that the City’s policy was 
permissible under the Direct Action Statute.205 
                                                                                                             
 198. Id. at 897 (majority opinion). 
 199. See MCKENZIE & JOHNSON, supra note 25, § 2:2, at 34. 
 200. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 897 n.18; id. at 901 (Knoll, J., dissenting); see also 
discussion infra Part III.C.2–3. 
 201. 760 So. 2d 302 (La. 1999). 
 202. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 896 (citing Hood v. Cotter, 5 So. 3d 819, 830 (La. 
2008); Anderson, 760 So. 2d at 306). 
 203. Id. at 896–97 (citing Hood, 5 So. 3d at 825). 
 204. Id. at 895 n.12 (citing Livingston Parish Sch. Bd. v. Fireman’s Fund Am. 
Ins. Co., 282 So. 2d 478, 481 n.4 (La. 1973)). The Livingston Parish School Board 
Court explained that an insurer might violate public policy if that “insurer, once 
having accepted a premium and agreed to cover professional negligence during 
the policy year, then attempted to withdraw its implied condition of providing 
continuous coverage at reasonable rates thereafter for the risk so insured, when 
discovered.” Livingston Parish Sch. Bd., 282 So. 2d at 481 n.4. 
 205. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 898. 
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The majority acknowledged that injured third persons usually do not 
have the ability to unearth the tortfeasor’s insurer on their own, and thus 
are not able to fulfill the notice requirement in a claims-made-and-reported 
policy themselves.206 Although this outcome may seem unfair, the 
majority reasoned that the insured tortfeasor has an incentive to give 
written notice of the claim to his or her insurer to avoid being wholly liable 
for the plaintiff’s injury.207 Based on this conclusion, the Court refused to 
extend coverage under the City’s policy to Ms. Gorman’s claims.208 The 
majority admitted that the City’s refusal to notify Lexington of Ms. 
Gorman’s pending claim, which baffled the Court, adversely affected Ms. 
Gorman.209 The Court ultimately determined, however, that penalizing 
Lexington for the City’s noncompliance with the policy by requiring 
coverage in a situation Lexington did not bargain for would be unfair.210 
The Court stated in a footnote that Ms. Gorman may not be able to 
collect any monetary award, even if a court determines that the City is liable, 
because the City, as a political subdivision, is not required to pay any 
judgment granted against it.211 The majority believed that this reason was 
not sufficient to deem the policy’s notice requirement unenforceable.212 
Justice Knoll, however, found the majority’s reasoning blatantly unfair.213 
She argued that the notice requirement violates the public policy 
considerations inherent in the Direct Action Statute.214 Based on the 
legislature’s original intent in passing the statute—protecting injured third 
persons by requiring insurers to provide coverage for their insolvent or 
bankrupt insureds—the City was clearly entitled to coverage against Ms. 
Gorman’s claims.215 Justice Knoll analogized the City to an insolvent 
insured, as the City can simply refuse to pay any judgment granted against 
it,216 and argued that the City should be insured against Ms. Gorman’s 
                                                                                                             
 206. Id. at 897. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 898. 
 209. Id. at 897. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10(C); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
13:5109(B)(2) (2012); Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 897 n.19 (“Even though payment 
of a resulting judgment, if any, by the City is discretionary in that an appropriation 
would be required and the City’s assets cannot be seized to satisfy a judgment, we 
are not free to modify the terms of the policy that were bargained for by the City 
and Lexington.” (citations omitted)). Ms. Gorman has since settled her claim 
against the City for an undisclosed amount. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 19. 
 212. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 897 n.19. 
 213. Id. at 901 (Knoll, J., dissenting). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. (citing MCKENZIE & JOHNSON, supra note 25, § 2:2, at 34). 
 216. See LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10(C); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
13:5109(B)(2) (2012). 
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claims because she did everything in her power to preserve her right of 
direct action against Lexington.217 
2. Insured Political Subdivisions Are Analogous to Insolvent 
Insureds 
The majority correctly noted that courts have traditionally deemed 
notice requirements in claims-made-and-reported policies to not violate 
the public policy considerations inherent in the Direct Action Statute.218 
Prior decisions by the Supreme Court, however, have hinted that in some 
instances a court may not enforce a notice requirement if it violates public 
policy,219 such as if a notice requirement limits a plaintiff’s right of direct 
action to less than a year from the date when the plaintiff’s cause of action 
against the insured tortfeasor arose.220 Note that Ms. Gorman’s right of 
direct action against Lexington was not restricted to less than a year, since 
the fact triggering her cause of action against the City—her son’s death—
arose on September 28, 2009, and the City’s policy did not expire until 
April 17, 2011.221 Thus, if one does not thoroughly analyze the public 
policy considerations inherent in the Direct Action Statute, the Gorman 
majority appears to be in line with the Supreme Court’s prior decisions.222 
Although much of Justice Knoll’s dissent directly contradicts long-
standing jurisprudence and basic insurance law, on this point the dissent 
makes a very compelling argument that the notice requirement in the 
                                                                                                             
 217. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 901 (Knoll, J., dissenting). 
 218. See, e.g., Hood v. Cotter, 5 So. 3d 819, 830 (La. 2008); Livingston Parish 
Sch. Bd. v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. Co., 282 So. 2d 478, 481 (La. 1973). 
 219. See Anderson v. Ichinose, 760 So. 2d 302, 306 n.5 (1999). 
 220. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:868(B) (2009). 
 221. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 893. 
 222. Most other states have also enforced notice provisions in claims-made-
and-reported policies because these provisions do not violate their state’s public 
policy. See, e.g., Gulf Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 433 So. 2d 512, 514 (Fla. 
1983); Zuckerman v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 395, 406 (N.J. 1985). 
In fact, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, a state which has its own direct action 
statute, recently ruled that Wisconsin’s notice-prejudice statutes, which 
specifically prohibit an insurer from relying on its insured’s failure to give written 
notice of a claim unless the insurer was prejudiced, do not apply to claims-made-
and-reported policies. See WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 631.81, 632.24, 632.26 (West 
2004); Anderson v. Aul, 862 N.W.2d 304, 308 (Wis. 2015) (“Upon considering 
the text of the notice-prejudice statutes, the historical context of claims-made-and-
reported policies, the statutory history of the notice-prejudice statutes, the 
consequences of alternative interpretations of the notice-prejudice statutes, and 
the purpose of claims-made-and-reported policies, we conclude that Wisconsin’s 
notice-prejudice statutes do not supersede the reporting requirement specific to 
claims-made-and-reported policies.”). 
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City’s insurance policy violates public policy.223 The legislature, by giving 
injured persons a right of direct action against insurance companies, 
intended to provide injured third parties a remedy when insolvent tortfeasors 
injured them.224 This insolvency provision still exists in the current version 
of the law, nearly one hundred years after its inception.225 
The Court should have analogized the City, as a political subdivision,226 
to an insolvent insured, as Justice Knoll did, so that the City would have 
been insured against the claims Ms. Gorman asserted against it. The 
Louisiana Constitution provides that the legislature has the ability to 
determine how judgments against the state, state agencies, and political 
subdivisions are to be paid.227 The legislature has decided that a plaintiff 
who wins a civil lawsuit against the state or a state agency can only receive 
that award if the legislature appropriates money for the sole purpose of 
satisfying that judgment.228 Likewise, in judgments against a political 
subdivision, the plaintiff only receives awarded damages if the political 
subdivision appropriates funds specifically to pay that judgment.229 
                                                                                                             
 223. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 901 (Knoll, J., dissenting) (arguing that because 
the City does not have to pay Ms. Gorman any judgment rendered against it, the 
Court should have analogized the City to an insolvent insured and extended 
coverage under the policy to Ms. Gorman’s claims). 
 224. See Act No. 253, 1918 La. Acts 461. 
 225. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269(A) (2009) (“No policy or contract of 
liability insurance shall be issued or delivered in this state, unless it contains 
provisions to the effect that the insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured shall not 
release the insurer from the payment of damages for injuries sustained or loss 
occasioned during the existence of the policy . . . .”). 
 226. The Constitution defines a political subdivision as “a parish, municipality, 
and any other unit of local government, including a school board and a special 
district, authorized by law to perform governmental functions.” LA. CONST. art. 
VI, § 44(2). A municipality is defined as “an incorporated city, town, or village.” 
Id. § 44(3). 
 227. Id. art. XII, § 10(C). Scholar W. Lee Hargrave argues that this constitutional 
provision was not intended to prevent plaintiffs from recovering judgments against 
the state or political subdivisions. W. Lee Hargrave, “Statutory” and “Hortatory” 
Provisions of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 43 LA. L. REV. 647, 655 (1983) 
(“[Louisiana Constitution article XII, section 10(C)] is not aimed at limiting the 
courts in a general manner in dealing with the state. Certainly, the attitude of the 
constitutional convention was to enlarge and protect individual rights, not to limit 
them. To interpret section 10(C) as some general prohibition against enforcement 
of judgments against the state would be inconsistent with that policy and would 
threaten the reach of judicial review, a review that was increased and strengthened 
during the convention.”); but see Kenneth M. Murchison, Local Government Law, 
38 LA. L. REV. 462, 475–476 n.76 (1978) (“[C]ertain statements in the constitutional 
convention debates on the section abolishing sovereign immunity indicate an 
intention to leave the judgment creditor at the mercy of the governmental body.”). 
 228. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5109(B)(2) (2012). 
 229. Id. 
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The legislature generally appropriates funds when a court rules in 
favor of a plaintiff in cases where the state or a state agency is a 
defendant,230 whereas political subdivisions are not well known for paying 
judgments granted against them.231 The Supreme Court has previously 
recognized that this creates “a right without a remedy” for plaintiffs with 
judgments against a political subdivision.232 The Court, however, deems 
itself powerless to force a political subdivision to pay a judgment rendered 
against it.233 In some instances, a political subdivision’s decision to not 
pay a judgment rendered against it may violate the United States 
Constitution,234 but so far neither federal nor Louisiana courts have 
addressed this issue. 
3. Political Subdivisions Are More Likely to Mistakenly Fail to 
Report Claims to Their Insurers than Individuals or Corporations 
The Gorman majority based its reasoning that the notice provision in 
the City’s policy is enforceable on the grounds that the insured tortfeasor 
has an incentive to shift liability to the insurer by reporting any adverse 
claim to its insurer.235 This is certainly true in most situations. In suits 
against an individual or corporation, the insured has an incentive to report 
any claim for which that insured is liable to its insurer. Solvent individuals 
and corporations have indicated, simply by purchasing insurance, that they 
do not wish for a court to hold them personally liable for any claims that 
an injured party may have against them. Further, the Direct Action Statute 
provides that an injured third person can sue the tortfeasor’s insurer 
                                                                                                             
 230. Hargrave, supra note 227, at 656. 
 231. See P. RAYMOND LAMONICA & JERRY G. JONES, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND 
PROCEDURE § 9.2, in 20 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 244, 342–43 (2d ed. 
2014) (“Appropriation of funds by a political subdivision (as by the state) is 
generally a discretionary legislative act by the governing body, and a judgment 
creditor against a political subdivision usually has no legal recourse to compel 
appropriation or seize assets to pay the judgment.”); see also Hargrave, supra note 
227, at 656 (“No legislation exists to force [political subdivisions] to pay their 
judgments . . . . In the absence of such legislation, there remains a serious problem 
with some local government units refusing to pay unpopular judgments.”). 
 232. Newman Marchive P’ship, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 979 So. 2d 1262, 
1270 (La. 2008). 
 233. Id. (“[A]s the judicial branch, like all branches, derives its power from 
the constitution, we are bound to accept the limitations placed upon us by that 
document.”). 
 234. Lee Hargrave, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 39 LA. L. REV. 807, 819 
(1979) (“If a city or a parish refused to pay when it had the funds to do so, the 
invasion of the individual interest would seem to be a substantial one, and the 
agency ought to be made to supply a rational basis for nonpayment; if none is 
forthcoming, it would appear that due process could be invoked.”). 
 235. Gorman v. City of Opelousas, 148 So. 3d 888, 897 (La. 2014). 
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directly without joining the tortfeasor as a defendant if the tortfeasor is 
insolvent.236 Thus, an insolvent tortfeasor who has assented to a claims-
made-and-reported policy and notifies his insurer of the suit is likely to be 
left out of the litigation altogether. Because of these incentives, insured 
persons who are sued will almost certainly comply with the policy’s notice 
provision. 
Political subdivisions have less of an incentive to report claims than 
individuals and corporations because they are not required to pay adverse 
judgments rendered against them.237 Thus, political subdivisions are more 
likely than individuals and corporations to fail to notify the insurer due to 
oversight.238 In Murray v. City of Bunkie,239 the Bunkie City Clerk 
attempted to send written notice of the plaintiff’s claim to the city’s 
insurer.240 Unfortunately, the city’s insurance agent delivered the notice to 
the wrong insurance company.241 That insurance company did not provide 
coverage for the claim and notified the city, which led the city to cancel 
that policy.242 Several months later, the Bunkie City Clerk finally 
discovered that a different insurance company had issued a policy to the 
city that covered the plaintiff’s claim.243 Although the city attempted to 
notify that insurance company, the policy period had already expired.244  
The City in Gorman also demonstrated this potential for nonfeasance 
by its failure to notify Lexington of Ms. Gorman’s claim.245 Ms. Gorman 
requested the name of the City’s insurer during discovery about four 
months before the City’s policy expired.246 The City did not reply until 
                                                                                                             
 236. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269(B)(2) (2009). 
 237. Id. § 13:5109(B)(2) (2012). 
 238. The possibility exists, however, that a political subdivision with a claims-
made-and-reported policy—which typically offers cheaper premiums than other 
types of policies—could refuse to notify its insurer of an adverse claim to avoid 
paying higher premiums, and then simply refuse to pay any judgment awarded to 
the plaintiff. See Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 897 & n.18; see also Hargrave, supra 
note 227, at 656. The Gorman majority was concerned with this possibility, but 
ultimately found that the City did not have such motives. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 
897. 
 239. 686 So. 2d 45 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1996). 
 240. Id. at 47. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. Although the Murray court determined that the city of Bunkie was 
covered under the policy, Gorman abrogated this holding because Murray 
misinterpreted the Direct Action Statute as granting substantive rights to an injured 
plaintiff against the tortfeasor’s insurer. See Gorman v. City of Opelousas, 148 
So. 3d 888, 895, 898 (La. 2014). 
 245. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 890. 
 246. Id. at 890–91. 
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Ms. Gorman threatened the City’s attorneys with sanctions.247 By then, the 
policy had expired.248 The Supreme Court indicated that there was “no 
evidence of fraud or collusion” between the City and Lexington,249 which 
implies that the likely reason for the City’s failure to report the claim was 
mere oversight. Similarly, the political subdivision in Murray failed to 
report the claim to the proper insurer because its insurance agent neglected 
to notice that the political subdivision had entered a new policy with a 
different insurer.250 A political subdivision’s failure to comply with its 
policy’s notice requirement out of neglect prejudices injured plaintiffs, 
who are left with “a right without a remedy”251—the policy provides no 
coverage because the insured did not satisfy the notice provision, and the 
political subdivision cannot be compelled to appropriate funds to pay the 
plaintiff a court-awarded judgment. 
Analogizing the City to an insolvent insured is also consistent with the 
principles of interpretation from the Louisiana Civil Code. The majority’s 
ultimate holding—that Ms. Gorman was not covered under the City’s 
policy because the City did not notify Lexington of her claim—resulted 
from its rigid application of the Direct Action Statute to the case.252 
Unfortunately, this led to an absurd result: Ms. Gorman, who filed her 
claim before it prescribed and directed the City to tell her who its liability 
insurer was,253 was unable to recover damages from Lexington due to the 
City’s inaction.254 The Louisiana Civil Code instructs the courts to not look 
to the legislature’s intent in passing a law unless the law is ambiguous or 
enforcement of the law as written results in “absurd consequences.”255 
Reasoning a contrario, the courts are to seek the legislative intent behind 
the law if the application of that law’s plain language to a case would result 
in an absurd outcome.256 The legislative intent behind the Direct Action 
Statute—to protect plaintiffs injured by insolvent insureds from having no 
                                                                                                             
 247. Plaintiff’s/Appellant’s Original Brief, supra note 92, at 3. 
 248. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 890. 
 249. Id. at 897. 
 250. Murray, 686 So. 2d at 47. 
 251. Newman Marchive P’ship, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 979 So. 2d 1262, 
1270 (La. 2008). 
 252. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 897–98. 
 253. Id. at 890. 
 254. Id. 
 255. LA. CIV. CODE art. 9 (2015). 
 256. Reasoning a contrario has been defined as follows: “When a text 
expressly states one thing it is deemed to deny the contrary . . . when one thing is 
included in a provision of law, it operates as an exclusion of things different from 
it.” Jean Carbonnier, Authorities in Civil Law: France, in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL 
DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS 91, 114 
(Joseph Dainow ed., 1974). 
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remedy—has been clear since its inception.257 Thus, the Court should have 
adopted Justice Knoll’s reasoning and analogized the City to an insolvent 
insured to extend coverage to Ms. Gorman’s claims under the City’s policy 
by holding that notice requirements in claims-made-and-reported policies, 
when issued to political subdivisions, violate the public policy considerations 
inherent in the Direct Action Statute.258  
This reasoning would not adversely affect the procedural nature of the 
Direct Action Statute but would still provide coverage for insured political 
subdivisions against plaintiffs like Ms. Gorman. Unfortunately, the Court 
simply ignored the overtly unjust result: the City’s negligence in refusing 
to notify Lexington of Ms. Gorman’s claim deprived her from recovering 
damages from Lexington for the City’s negligent actions that led to her 
son’s death.259 
IV. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION: AN AMENDMENT 
TO THE INSURANCE CODE 
The public policy inherent in the Direct Action Statute indicates that 
liability policies are issued to safeguard the public, particularly from 
insolvent insureds.260 A political subdivision acts as an insolvent insured 
if it chooses to not pay damages when a court renders judgment against it, 
as public property cannot be seized to satisfy a judgment under the 
Louisiana Constitution like private property can.261 Further, most political 
subdivisions are required to obtain insurance.262 Thus, public policy 
dictates that insured political subdivisions should not be treated as insured 
individuals or corporations.263 Gorman’s broad holding ignores the 
                                                                                                             
 257. See Act No. 253, 1918 La. Acts 461; see also MCKENZIE & JOHNSON, 
supra note 25, § 2:2, at 34. 
 258. See Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 888, 901 (Knoll, J., dissenting). 
 259. See id. at 901. 
 260. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269 (2009); see also Gorman, 148 So. 3d 
at 894. 
 261. LA. CONST. art XII, § 10(C); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5109(B)(2) 
(2012); Newman Marchive P’ship, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 979 So. 2d 1262, 1271 
(La. 2008) (“[Louisiana Revised Statutes section] 13:5109(B)(2) requires a specific 
appropriation of funds to pay a particular judgment before disbursement of those 
funds may be compelled . . . . Prior to such an appropriation, the funds remain 
‘public funds,’ and any effort by the judiciary to direct their disbursement would 
constitute an unlawful seizure of public funds . . . .”). 
 262. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:3061 (2009) (“It is recognized that 
municipalities, parishes, and school boards of the state must insure themselves 
and their employees and officers from various monetary risks and exposures, and 
that it is necessary to accord municipalities, parishes, and school boards great 
latitude in contracting for such insurance . . . to allow such entities to secure such 
insurance at the lowest possible cost . . . .”). 
 263. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269 (2009). 
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injustice that results when a political subdivision fails to comply with its 
claims-made-and-reported policy’s notice requirement—the plaintiff’s 
claims are not covered under the policy, and the plaintiff cannot execute 
any judgment a court may render against the political subdivision. 
Although the Court should reverse itself in light of the correct 
application of the public policy considerations inherent in the law, a more 
clear and immediate remedy is for the legislature to amend the Insurance 
Code to prohibit the enforcement of notice provisions in claims-made-and-
reported policies issued to political subdivisions against injured third 
persons. This amendment would uphold Gorman’s correct interpretations 
of the statute while instructing the courts in how to correctly apply the law 
to insured political subdivisions.264 The proposed amendment would read 
as follows: 
Any provision in a policy or contract of liability insurance issued 
or delivered to a political subdivision of this state that requires the 
insured to provide notice to the insurer for coverage to be triggered 
shall be deemed null and void.  
This proposed amendment solves many potential problems with 
Gorman’s holding and reinforces both the legislative intent and the public 
policy considerations inherent in the Direct Action Statute. First, the 
amendment clarifies that notice requirements in claims-made-and-reported 
policies do not inherently violate public policy,265 unless those policies are 
issued to political subdivisions.266 Individuals and corporations have an 
incentive to report any claims made against them to their insurer to avoid 
                                                                                                             
 264. The legislature can pass legislation to show courts how to correctly 
interpret a remedial law, but cannot legislatively overrule a court’s interpretation 
of substantive legislation. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 
809, 819 (La. 1992). The Direct Action Statute is remedial legislation, so this 
amendment to the Insurance Code is constitutional. See Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 
895–96. 
 265. See Hood v. Cotter, 5 So. 3d 819, 830 (La. 2008). Although some insured 
persons may be insolvent, and thus unable to pay a judgment rendered against 
them, such an insured still has an incentive to notify its insurer. The Direct Action 
Statute provides that when the insured is insolvent or bankrupt, the injured person 
can file a claim against the insurer without having to name the insured as a party. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269(B)(1)(a)–(b). Insolvent or bankrupt insureds have 
a strong incentive to avoid litigation by notifying the insurer of a pending claim. 
 266. Legislation preventing the state or state agencies from obtaining claims-
made-and-reported policies is not necessary because the state tends to appropriate 
money to pay plaintiffs who win lawsuits against the state or state agencies. See 
Hargrave, supra note 227, at 656 (“[T]he state has an excellent record of 
appropriating funds to pay judgments rendered against it. The problems that have 
arisen in collecting money judgments involve payment of judgments by 
municipalities and parish governing authorities.”). 
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liability and to avail themselves of the coverage for which they paid.267 A 
political subdivision, on the other hand, cannot be forced to pay damages 
and, as a result, has less of an incentive to report a claim to its insurer.268 
Because a political subdivision has less of an incentive to report a claim 
than an individual or corporation, this amendment prevents an insurer from 
relying on its policy’s notice provision to deprive the injured plaintiff of a 
remedy.269 
Second, this amendment furthers the public policy that liability policies 
are intended to protect injured third parties.270 Gorman demonstrates that 
political subdivisions can refuse to notify their insurer of a pending claim 
while maintaining the option of not paying the injured claimant damages.271 
The only party adversely affected by this outcome is the injured third person, 
as neither the political subdivision nor its insurer is required to pay 
damages. Clearly, this result does not protect injured third parties. The 
proposed amendment remedies this troubling result by preventing insurers 
of political subdivisions from relying on the notice provision in a claims-
made-and-reported policy to deny coverage to claims asserted by injured 
third parties. Further, this amendment relieves the political subdivision of 
having to do anything—other than pay its premiums272—for coverage to 
be triggered. The injured third person will trigger coverage when he is 
injured, if the policy is an occurrence policy, or when he files his claim 
against the insured during the policy period, if the policy is a claims-made 
policy, which is identical to a claims-made-and-reported policy except that 
notice to the insurer is not required.273 
Finally, this amendment, which interprets remedial legislation that the 
Gorman Court misunderstood,274 does no violence to the procedural nature 
                                                                                                             
 267. See Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 897. 
 268. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5109(B)(2) (2012); see, e.g., Gorman, 148 
So. 3d at 897; Murray v. City of Bunkie, 686 So. 2d 45, 47 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1996). 
 269. See, e.g., Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 897; Murray, 686 So. 2d at 47. 
 270. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269(D). 
 271. See id. § 13:5109(B)(2); see also Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 890, 897 n.19. 
 272. One side effect of this amendment is that insurance companies will likely 
charge political subdivisions higher premiums. In light of the public policy that 
liability policies are aimed at safeguarding members of the public, ensuring that 
injured third persons are covered outweighs the burden on political subdivisions 
to pay higher premiums. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269(D). 
 273. See MCKENZIE & JOHNSON, supra note 25, § 6:25, at 593. 
 274. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809, 819 
(La. 1992) (“The principle of separation of powers does not exclude the authority 
of the legislature to enact clearly interpretive laws, clarifying the meaning of 
previously enacted texts outside the context of litigation. Of course, it is a different 
matter when the legislature actually amends previously enacted legislation by 
laws designated as interpretive.” (quoting A.N. Yiannopoulos, Validity of Patents 
Conveying Navigable Waterbottoms—Act 62 of 1912, Price, Carter, and All That, 
32 LA. L. REV. 1, 16 (1971))). 
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of the Direct Action Statute. The Gorman Court reasoned that the Direct 
Action Statute grants injured persons a procedural right.275 The amendment, 
which does not contradict this holding, thus preserves over 60 years of 
jurisprudence that correctly interprets the Direct Action Statute as granting 
a procedural right of action to plaintiffs who have a cause of action against 
the insured tortfeasor.276 Unfortunately, three members of the Court 
incorrectly interpreted the Direct Action Statute as bestowing substantive 
rights on third persons.277 If just one justice in the majority had joined Justice 
Knoll’s opinion, over 60 years of jurisprudence on the Direct Action Statute 
would have been overturned.278 When the current makeup of the Court 
changes, a different majority in a similar case may rely on the dissent’s 
reasoning and throw the interpretation of the Direct Action Statute into 
chaos, forcing the legislature to act. The proposed amendment solves this 
potential problem by providing future courts with guidance in interpreting 
the Direct Action Statute by preventing political subdivisions from 
obtaining claims-made-and-reported policies while preserving Gorman’s 
holding on the other issues of the case. 
CONCLUSION 
Although most of the Gorman opinion correctly interprets the Direct 
Action Statute, the majority does not provide sound reasoning for its 
views. The Gorman majority fails to acknowledge that the Court 
determined that the Direct Action Statute was remedial legislation over 60 
years ago,279 and that only a few isolated appellate courts280 and federal 
courts281 have departed from this view. But the majority correctly notes 
that it could not treat a claims-made-and-reported policy the same as an 
occurrence policy.282 Unfortunately, the majority does not explain that a 
notice requirement in the former policy outlines the scope of the insurer’s 
duty, whereas a notice requirement in the latter policy does not trigger 
                                                                                                             
 275. See Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 896. 
 276. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 62 So. 2d 828, 
831 (La. 1952); Cacamo v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 764 So. 2d 41, 43 (La. 
2000)); see also Johnson, supra note 27, at 1460–61. 
 277. See Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 903 (Knoll, J., dissenting). 
 278. Id. at 900; see also Home Ins., 62 So. 2d at 831. 
 279. See Home Ins., 62 So. 2d at 831. 
 280. See Williams v. Lemaire, 655 So. 2d 765, 767–68 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1995) 
(citing West v. Monroe Bakery, Inc., 46 So. 2d 122 (La. 1950)); see also Murray 
v. City of Bunkie, 686 So. 2d 45, 48–49 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1996) (citing Williams, 
655 So. 2d at 767–68). 
 281. See, e.g., Auster Oil & Gas, Inc., v. Stream, 891 F.2d 570, 577–78 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (citing West, 46 So. 2d at 123); In re Combustion, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 
1056, 1061 (W.D. La. 1997) (quoting West, 46 So. 2d at 123). 
 282. Gorman, 148 So. 3d at 897. 
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coverage and thus disrupts the injured person’s direct action against the 
insurer.283  
The majority errs in holding that claims-made-and-reported policies 
issued to political subdivisions are not against public policy.284 This 
finding leaves plaintiffs in Ms. Gorman’s position “a right without a 
remedy”285 while ignoring the risk that political subdivisions will not 
report claims to their insurers due to oversight.286 Due to this potentially 
inequitable outcome, the legislature must act to protect the public by 
amending the Insurance Code to prohibit political subdivisions from 
obtaining claims-made-and-reported policies. This amendment would 
further the public policy considerations in the Direct Action Statute by 
ensuring that injured plaintiffs in Ms. Gorman’s situation have not only a 
right, but also a remedy. 
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